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Does This Dog Hunt?
Testing the Performance of the Dogs of the Dow Strategy in the
U.S. and in Brazil
Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal1
André Luiz Carvalhal da Silva
Michael Austin
This study analyzes the performance of the Dogs of the Dow Jones
(DoD) investment strategy in the U.S and in Brazil on an absolute and
on a risk adjusted basis. The DoD is a value oriented strategy that calls
for investing equal dollar amounts in the highest yielding components
of the Dow Jones. Our performance evaluation findings demonstrate
that the DoD strategy shows only limited evidence that it can add value
as an investment strategy in the U.S stock market. The use of the DoD
strategy in Brazil shows virtually no evidence that it can add value as
an investment strategy. Our analysis suggests that the dividend yield
may not be a good variable to select value stocks in the U.S and in
Brazil given existing empirical evidence that value stocks have
outperformed growth stocks in these markets.
1 INTRODUCTION
The Dogs of the Dow Jones (DoD) is a value oriented strategy that became popular
in the United States recently due to its simplicity and its alleged ability to outperform
popular market indices. The theoretical basis for a value oriented strategy is that the
stock’s current price is low relative to the book value, earnings, dividends, cash flow or
other measures of value. The DoD strategy comes in a variety of versions, all of which call
for investing equal amounts in the highest yielding components of the Dow Jones Industrial
Average. One year later, the portfolio is rebalanced and updated with equally weighted
investments in the new DoD stocks.
The theoretical basis for the strategy can be traced to the theory of corporate
dividend policy. The numerator of dividend yield is the annualized dividend payout and the
denominator is the stock’s current price. Corporations strive to maintain stable dividend
payouts to avoid sending undesirable signals to the markets about the company’s future
                                                          
1 Ricardo Leal, D. Sc., is Director and professor of finance at COPPEAD/UFRJ; André Carvalhal da Silva is
Doctoral Student, M.Sci. and Researcher of CEPS (Centro de Estudos e Pesquisa em Seguros) at
COPPEAD/UFRJ and Michael Austin is a Private Investor.
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business prospects. If the market driven equity prices exceed (fall below) intrinsic market
values, they will produce lower (higher) dividend yields, due to the more stable policy
driven dividend payout.
Recent empirical research by Fama and French (1992) is consistent with a high
dividend yield strategy outperforming the market. They argue that observed excess returns
represent market compensation for risk associated with investments in small capitalization
stocks and company specific distress risk impounded in share prices. They find that market
capitalization and book-to-market equity explain observed stock returns. Variables like
price-to-earnings, book-to-market equity, and dividend yield are all scaled versions of a
firm’s stock price. Therefore, to the extent the DoD strategy outperforms the market
proponents of efficient markets would argue that the DoD strategy is capturing the
information impounded in dividend yield which Fama and French found in the book-to-
market equity ratio.
Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1996) argue that value strategies are
fundamentally riskier and therefore the higher average returns associated with high book-
to-market stocks reflect compensation for bearing this risk. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny
(1994), however, argue that value strategies yield higher returns because investors are
able to identify mispriced stocks and not because they are fundamentally riskier.
Capaul, Rowley and Sharpe (1993) document the superior performance of the
value investing strategies in six countries over the period from 1981 through 1992.
McQueen, Shields and Thorley (1997) report that the DoD strategy beats the Dow Jones
statistically; however, after adjusting for the DoD portfolio’s higher risk, extra transaction
costs, and unfavorable tax treatment, the DoD does not beat the market economically.
Barry et al (1997) examined size and price-to-book value (P/BV) effects in cross-sectional
returns for 26 emerging markets during 1985-1995. The tests are based on four regional
portfolios and on a composite portfolio that uses all of the data. They formed multi-market
portfolios by using relative measures of size and P/BV. In univariate tests, they find some
evidence of the P/BV effect but do not find evidence of the size effect. However, in asset
pricing tests based on cross sectional regressions, size is priced in three of four regions
and in the composite result, whereas P/BV is priced in just two of four regions but not in
the composite portfolio.
In a recent study, Fama and French (1998) document that value stocks have higher
returns than growth stocks in developed markets around the world. They report that there
is also a value premium in emerging markets. In Brazil, the average difference between
annual dollar returns on the high and low book-to-market portfolios is 73.72% over the
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1987 to 1995 period. Braga, Costa Jr. and Mescolin (1998) report a value premium in
the Brazilian stock market from 1986 through 1996. They show that value portfolios
formed on book-to-market equity and dividend yield have higher returns than growth
portfolios. Claessens et al (1998) find evidence on the ability of factors to explain cross-
sectional returns in a group of eighteen emerging markets. In addition to beta, two factors
– size and trading volume – have considerable power in explaining returns; dividend yield
and earnings/price ratios are somewhat less important.
This article will provide background on the DoD strategy, describe the theoretical
rationale for why it may have investment merit, and conduct a performance evaluation on
whether the strategy outperforms, on both an absolute and a risk adjusted basis, a buy
and hold investment strategy in the broad based equity market indices in the American and
Brazilian stock markets.
2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The DoD strategy was widely popularized by Bary (1993, 1994) and O’Higgins
and Downes (1990). The DoD strategy consists in investing equal amounts in the highest
yielding components of the Dow Jones. At the end of the year, the portfolio is rebalanced
and updated with the new DoD stocks. We will test the most popular versions of the DoD
strategy: the ten highest yielding stocks (Top 10), the five highest yielding stocks (Top 5),
the highest yielding stock by itself (Top 1) and the second highest yielding stock by itself or
what has been called the stock with the “penultimate profit potential” (PPP). We have
performed all our tests for one year holding period starting from the end of each of the
twelve calendar months. Using this approach we will be able to ascertain whether the DoD
strategy has a seasonal characteristic.
We will test the performance of the strategy both on an absolute and on a risk
adjusted basis. We have statistically tested the strategy’s absolute return by employing a
measure called “differential return” by Sharpe (1994)12. To measure the risk adjusted
performance of the DoD, we employ two traditional measures of risk adjusted
performance: the Treynor (1965) ratio and Jensen’s (1968) alpha. The Treynor ratio
measures performance relative to non-diversifiable risk (beta). Jensen’s alpha is an
                                                          
2 Sharpe has shown that his popular performance measure used for deriving risk adjusted portfolio
performance can be generalized to statistically test for absolute performance relative to any desired
benchmark.
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alternative performance measure which assumes a portfolio will underperform or
outperform a benchmark market index after adjusting for market correlated returns using
the security market line of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). If the portfolio out
(under) performs the market after adjusting for beta risk, the estimated alpha will be
positive (negative).
We will conduct a performance evaluation of the DoD strategy in a developed and
in an emerging market. Emerging market equities have gained increasing acceptance
among investors trying to enhance portfolio returns. Brazil is the most important emerging
market in Latin America and one of the major emerging markets in the world. The
Brazilian market capitalization in 1998 (US$ 161 billion) was the 4th largest among all
emerging markets in the Emerging Market Database maintained by the International
Finance Corporation (IFC). Our performance evaluation will be tested in the U.S. and in
the Brazilian stock market. The data for this study are taken from the Datastream database
(U.S. stock market) and from the Economatica database (Brazilian stock market).
We have performed the evaluation in the U.S. stock market for the available data
from January 1980 through December 1998, which provides 228 monthly observations
for individual stocks. The sample covered for the Brazilian stock market is the 54-month
period from July 1994 to December 1998. By focusing on the 1994 to 1998 period, this
paper studies the behavior of stock returns after the “Real Plan” that introduced a new
currency and suceeded in taming inflation.
Market returns in the U.S. are proxied by the monthly total return on the DJ30 and
S&P500 stock indices. In Brazil, market returns are proxied by the monthly total return on
the IBOVESPA (the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange Index) and on the FGV100 index (an index
of 100 non-state owned corporations). The IBOVESPA is a representative indicator of price
performance in the Brazilian stock market, since it clearly shows the behavior of the main
shares traded on the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA). The index portfolio is made
up of stocks which jointly represent 80% of the amount of cash transacted during the
twelve months preceding the formation of the portfolio. The participation of each stock in
the portfolio has a direct relationship with its proportion of trading volume. The FGV100 is
composed by 100 stocks of non-state owned nonfinancial firms. The participation of each
stock in the portfolio has a direct relationship with the firm’s book value of common
equity.
The riskless rate of return used for the U.S. market is the monthly return on 3-month
Treasury Bills. In Brazil, the riskless rate of return used is the monthly equivalent CDI
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(Interbank Certificate of Deposit, the average monthly equivalent of the prime rate for one
day loans between financial institutions). This rate is the most commonly used investment
benchmark in Brazil, yielding virtually the same as the equivalent one-day repo rates on
government securities (the "Over/SELIC" rate). Thus we decided to use the benchmark
widely followed by the market.
Returns are monthly total returns (price change adjusted by corporate actions such
as cash dividends, stock dividends, rights offers, etc.) in U.S. dollars, based on month-end
prices. It should be noted that we compute the dividend yield only for stocks in the DJ30
(U.S. stock market) and in the IBOVESPA (Brazilian stock market). Thus, the DoD portfolios
are formed by the highest yielding components of the DJ30 and of the IBOVESPA.
3 RESULTS FOR THE U.S. STOCK MARKET
All the proponents of the DoD strategy demonstrate it’s virtues by comparing the
strategy’s returns relative to the DJ30. As a point of reference we have reconstructed the
performance evaluation approach used by DoD proponents over our sample period. The
results are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1 - Mean Monthly Returns for the DoD Strategies, DJ30, S&P500 and
3-Month Treasury Bill
January 1980 to December 1998
Top1 PPP Top 5 Top 10 DJ30 S&P500 T-BILL
Average Return 2.04% 0.32% 1.22% 1.21% 1.15% 1.17% 0.59%
Std Dev of Return 8.70% 7.07% 4.56% 4.36% 4.37% 4.35% 0.24%
Geometric Mean Return 1.64% 0.06% 1.11% 1.11% 1.06% 1.07% 0.55%
Table 1 is consistent with the performance claims of the proponents of the DoD.
Over the nineteen year period from 1980 through 1998, except for the PPP version, the
other DoD strategies outperform the DJ30 and the S&P 500 on an absolute basis. The
average monthly return of the DJ30 over the period is 1.15% compared to returns for the
various DoD strategies ranging from 0.32% to 2.04%. Despite their superior returns, the
DOD strategies also have higher variability of returns than the DJ30 and the S&P500.
Comparing the geometric mean of return, all the DoD strategies, except for the PPP
version, outperform the DJ30 and the S&P 500.
In Table 2 we computed Sharpe’s “differential return” performance measure using
the DJ30 as the market index benchmark. Using the market index return rather than the
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Treasury Bill rate, as is traditionally done with the Sharpe ratio, is the appropriate way of
measuring the absolute performance of the DoD strategy. By using the “differential return”
version of the Sharpe ratio relative to the DJ30 we can directly statistically test the
strategy’s absolute performance (see Sharpe (1994)).
Tables 2 shows differential returns defined as the twelve month average holding
period excess returns for each DoD strategy relative to the DJ30 by the end of the month
in which the strategy was initiated. Many of the differential returns (30 out of 48 differential
returns) are positive; however, no strategy significantly outperforms the market at the 95%
level. Therefore, we conclude that there does not exist statistical evidence to support the
argument that the DoD strategies outperform the DJ30 on an absolute basis.
Table 2 - Sharpe’s Differential Returns Relative to the DJ30
by End of Month Initiated
Month Top 1 PPP Top 5 Top 10
January 0.89% -0.84% * 0.06% 0.06%
February 0.81% -0.17% 0.06% 0.02%
March 0.61% 0.01% -0.14% -0.08%
April 0.56% 0.25% -0.06% -0.11%
May 0.73% 0.22% -0.01% -0.02%
June 0.72% 0.07% -0.05% -0.02%
July 0.61% -0.12% -0.07% 0.02%
August 0.11% 0.27% 0.03% 0.00%
September -0.19% -0.15% 0.02% 0.05%
October 0.09% -0.18% 0.11% -0.01%
November 0.26% -0.17% 0.07% 0.02%
December 0.62% -0.11% 0.10% 0.06%
No Returns < 0     1     7    5 5
*  significant at the 95% level
Table 3 shows the differential returns for each DoD strategy relative to the S&P500
by the end of the month in which the strategy was initiated. We find that most of the
differential returns are positive (31 out of 48 differential returns) but none of them is
statistically significant at the 95% level. Therefore, there is no statistical evidence that the
DoD strategies outperform the S&P500 on an absolute basis.
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Table 3 - Sharpe’s Differential Returns Relative to the S&P500 by End of Month
Initiated
Month Top 1 PPP Top 5 Top 10
January 0.87% -0.85% * 0.05% 0.04%
February 0.80% -0.18% 0.05% 0.01%
March 0.60% 0.00% -0.14% -0.09%
April 0.55% 0.24% -0.07% -0.12%
May 0.72% 0.21% -0.02% -0.03%
June 0.72% 0.06% -0.06% -0.03%
July 0.60% -0.13% -0.07% 0.01%
August 0.10% 0.26% 0.02% -0.01%
September -0.20% -0.15% 0.01% 0.05%
October 0.10% -0.17% 0.12% -0.01%
November 0.28% -0.15% 0.08% 0.04%
December 0.65% -0.08% 0.13% 0.09%
No Returns < 0    1     7    5    6
*  significant at the 95% level
Even if the evidence does not indicate that the DoD strategy outperforms the market
on an absolute basis, the strategy may provide for reduction in total portfolio risk which
could make it advantageous to use for selecting stocks to be added to an already
diversified portfolio. In order to perform risk adjusted performance tests we employed
Jensen's alpha and Treynor ratios. We ran regressions of the excess return on the DoD
strategy over the Treasury Bill rate against the excess return on the market index (DJ30 and
S&P500) over the Treasury Bill rate. Table IV shows estimated beta values relative to the
DJ30 for each DoD strategy by the month it was initiated. All of the beta values are
significant and below unity indicating that the DoD strategy has a low market risk.
Table 4 - DJ30 Betas by End of Month Initiated
Month Top 1 PPP Top 5 Top 10
January 0.69 * 0.84 * 0.80 * 0.90 *
February 0.58 * 0.89 * 0.75 * 0.90 *
March 0.66 * 0.85 * 0.73 * 0.89 *
April 0.70 * 0.64 * 0.71 * 0.87 *
May 0.72 * 0.82 * 0.71 * 0.88 *
June 0.80 * 0.71 * 0.76 * 0.87 *
July 0.72 * 0.83 * 0.77 * 0.87 *
August 0.76 * 0.86 * 0.78 * 0.87 *
September 0.56 * 0.75 * 0.79 * 0.88 *
October 0.57 * 0.83 * 0.76 * 0.87 *
November 0.51 * 0.87 * 0.79 * 0.89 *
December 0.56 * 0.93 * 0.78 * 0.88 *
Mean 0.65 0.82 0.76 0.88
*  significant at the 95% level
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Table 5 shows estimated beta values relative to the S&P500 for each DoD strategy
by the month it was initiated. All the beta values are significant and below the unity
indicating that the DoD strategy is a lower risk strategy than investing in the market and
would appeal to investors who prefer conservative, lower risk portfolios.
Table 5 - S&P500 Betas by End of Month Initiated
Month Top 1 PPP Top 5 Top 10
January 0.63 * 0.80 * 0.79 * 0.89 *
February 0.52 * 0.84 * 0.74 * 0.88 *
March 0.62 * 0.82 * 0.72 * 0.87 *
April 0.67 * 0.69 * 0.70 * 0.85 *
May 0.67 * 0.84 * 0.71 * 0.86 *
June 0.72 * 0.73 * 0.76 * 0.86 *
July 0.69 * 0.81 * 0.76 * 0.86 *
August 0.73 * 0.83 * 0.78 * 0.85 *
September 0.52 * 0.72 * 0.77 * 0.86 *
October 0.52 * 0.81 * 0.75 * 0.85 *
November 0.47 * 0.85 * 0.77 * 0.87 *
December 0.55 * 0.90 * 0.78 * 0.86 *
Mean 0.61 0.80 0.75 0.86
*  significant at the 95% level
Table 6 summarizes Jensen’s alpha relative to the DJ30 by month for each DoD
strategy. Most of the DoD strategies exhibit positive alphas (40 out of 48 Jensen’s alphas)
but few of them are statistically significant at the 95% level. Therefore, we conclude that
the evidence using alphas does not indicate that the DoD strategies achieve statistically
significant risk adjusted excess returns.
Table 6 - Jensen’s Alpha Relative to the DJ30 by End of Month Initiated
Month Top 1 PPP Top 5 Top 10
January 1.07% * -0.75% * 0.17% 0.11%
February 1.04% * -0.10% 0.20% 0.07%
March 0.80% 0.09% 0.01% -0.02%
April 0.75% 0.47% 0.12% -0.03%
May 0.90% 0.33% 0.16% 0.06%
June 0.84% * 0.24% 0.09% 0.05%
July 0.77% * -0.02% 0.06% 0.09%
August 0.24% 0.35% 0.16% 0.07%
September 0.06% 0.01% 0.14% 0.12%
October 0.34% -0.08% 0.25% 0.06%
November 0.55% -0.09% 0.19% 0.09%
December 0.86% -0.07% 0.21% 0.13%
No Alphas < 0    0     6    0    2
*  significant at the 95% level
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Table 7 summarizes Jensen’s alpha relative to the S&P500 by month for each DoD
strategy. Most of the DoD strategies exhibit positive alphas (40 out of 48 Jensen’s alphas)
but few of them are statistically significant at the 95% level. The evidence once again does
not suggest that the DoD strategies achieve statistically significant risk adjusted excess
returns. The results of Table VI and Table VII suggest that the DoD, as a stand alone
investment strategy, does not yield statistically significant risk adjusted excess returns and,
as such, would be inappropriate for small investors who do not hold diversified portfolios.
Table 7 - Jensen’s Alpha Relative to the S&P500 by End of Month Initiated
Month Top 1 PPP Top 5 Top 10
January 1.09% * -0.73% * 0.17% 0.11%
February 1.07% * -0.09% 0.20% 0.08%
March 0.82% 0.10% 0.01% -0.01%
April 0.76% 0.43% 0.12% -0.03%
May 0.92% 0.31% 0.16% 0.06%
June 0.88% * 0.22% 0.08% 0.05%
July 0.79% * -0.01% 0.07% 0.09%
August 0.25% 0.35% 0.15% 0.07%
September 0.08% 0.01% 0.14% 0.13%
October 0.37% -0.06% 0.26% 0.08%
November 0.58% -0.07% 0.22% 0.11%
December 0.89% -0.02% 0.25% 0.17%
No Alphas < 0    0     6    0   2
* significant at the 95% level
Table 8 shows Treynor ratios relative to the DJ30 by month initiated for each DoD
strategy. It is clear from Table VIII that all the DoD strategies outperform the DJ30 after
adjusting for risk. Lastly, we have performed a differences in means test of the DoD
strategies relative to the DJ30 and found that only the Top1 and Top 5 DoD strategies
significantly outperform the market after adjusting for risk.
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Table 8 - Treynor Ratio with DJ30 Betas by End of Month Initiated








January 2.11% -0.33% 0.78% 0.69% 0.56% 1.55% -0.89% 0.22% 0.12%
February 2.36% 0.43% 0.82% 0.63% 0.55% 1.81% -0.12% 0.27% 0.08%
March 1.79% 0.67% 0.58% 0.54% 0.56% 1.22% 0.11% 0.01% -0.02%
April 1.68% 1.35% 0.78% 0.58% 0.61% 1.07% 0.74% 0.17% -0.03%
May 1.85% 1.00% 0.83% 0.66% 0.60% 1.25% 0.41% 0.23% 0.06%
June 1.64% 0.92% 0.70% 0.65% 0.59% 1.05% 0.33% 0.11% 0.06%
July 1.66% 0.56% 0.67% 0.69% 0.59% 1.07% -0.03% 0.08% 0.10%
August 0.88% 0.97% 0.76% 0.64% 0.56% 0.32% 0.41% 0.20% 0.08%
September 0.67% 0.56% 0.74% 0.71% 0.57% 0.11% -0.01% 0.18% 0.14%
October 1.17% 0.48% 0.90% 0.64% 0.58% 0.60% -0.09% 0.32% 0.07%
November 1.66% 0.49% 0.83% 0.69% 0.59% 1.07% -0.10% 0.24% 0.10%
December 2.09% 0.49% 0.84% 0.71% 0.56% 1.53% -0.07% 0.28% 0.15%
Mean 1.63% 0.63% 0.77% 0.65% 0.58% 1.05% 0.06% 0.19% 0.08%
Std Dev 0.50% 0.41% 0.09% 0.05% 0.02% 0.50% 0.40% 0.09% 0.06%
t test - - - - - 2.11 * 0.14 2.18 * 1.38
* significant at 5% level
NM indicates not meaningful due to insignificant beta estimates at 5% level
Table IX shows Treynor ratios relative to the S&P500 by month initiated for each
DoD strategy. The results suggest that only the Top 1 and Top 5 DoD strategies
significantly outperform the market after adjusting for risk.
Table 9 - Treynor Ratio with S&P500 Betas by End of Month Initiated








January 2.30% -0.34% 0.79% 0.70% 0.58% 1.72% -0.92% 0.22% 0.12%
February 2.62% 0.46% 0.83% 0.65% 0.56% 2.07% -0.10% 0.27% 0.09%
March 1.88% 0.70% 0.59% 0.56% 0.57% 1.31% 0.13% 0.02% -0.01%
April 1.76% 1.24% 0.79% 0.59% 0.62% 1.14% 0.62% 0.17% -0.03%
May 1.98% 0.98% 0.83% 0.68% 0.61% 1.37% 0.37% 0.22% 0.07%
June 1.83% 0.90% 0.70% 0.66% 0.60% 1.23% 0.30% 0.11% 0.06%
July 1.74% 0.57% 0.68% 0.70% 0.59% 1.14% -0.02% 0.09% 0.11%
August 0.92% 1.00% 0.76% 0.66% 0.57% 0.35% 0.43% 0.19% 0.09%
September 0.73% 0.59% 0.76% 0.72% 0.58% 0.15% 0.01% 0.18% 0.15%
October 1.30% 0.49% 0.92% 0.66% 0.57% 0.72% -0.08% 0.35% 0.09%
November 1.81% 0.50% 0.86% 0.70% 0.57% 1.24% -0.08% 0.28% 0.13%
December 2.16% 0.51% 0.85% 0.73% 0.53% 1.63% -0.03% 0.32% 0.20%
Mean 1.75% 0.63% 0.78% 0.67% 0.58% 1.17% 0.05% 0.20% 0.09%
Std Dev 0.54% 0.40% 0.09% 0.05% 0.02% 0.55% 0.39% 0.10% 0.06%
t test - - - - - 2.14 * 0.14 2.07 * 1.38
* significant at 5% level
NM indicates not meaningful due to insignificant beta estimates at 5% level
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4 RESULTS FOR THE BRAZILIAN STOCK MARKET
We have performed the same evaluation used for U.S. stocks to analyze the DoD
strategy in the Brazilian stock market. Table X shows the average and geometric mean
monthly returns for the IBOVESPA, FGV100, the CDI and each of the DoD strategies. All
data for the Brazilian market are in U.S. dollars. Over the period from 1994 through
1998, only the Top 1 version outperforms the FGV100 and the IBOVESPA on an absolute
basis. The average return of the FGV100 is 0.28% per month compared to returns for the
various DoD strategies ranging from -0.40% to 2.57% per month. The problem with this
approach is that the IBOVESPA outperforms the FGV100 over the sample period. As we
can see from the standard deviation of returns, all the DoD strategies have greater
variability than the FGV100. Furthermore, the Top 1 and PPP DoD strategies have greater
variability than the IBOVESPA. Comparing the geometric mean of return, all the DoD
strategies underperform the FGV100 and the IBOVESPA. This result conflicts with the
average returns results.  It is well known that the larger the variability in returns the larger
will be the deviation between average and geometric mean return.
Table 10 - Mean Monthly Returns for the DoD Strategies, IBOVESPA, FGV100
and CDI
July 1994 to December 1998
Top1 PPP Top 5 Top 10 FGV-100 Ibovespa CDI
Average Return 2.57% -0.40% -0.10% -0.05% 0.28% 1.69% 2.28%
Std Dev of Return 27.40% 14.72% 11.48% 10.67% 9.85% 13.00% 2.34%
Geometric Mean Return -0.19% -1.40% -0.73% -0.59% -0.19% 0.81% 2.25%
Table 11 shows Sharpe’s “differential return” performance measure using the
FGV100 as the market index benchmark. We find that many of the differential returns are
negative (20 out of 48 differential returns) and only the PPP strategy initiated in January
significantly outperforms the market at the 95% level. Therefore, we conclude that there
does not exist statistical evidence to support the argument that the DoD strategies
outperform the FGV100.
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Table 11 - Sharpe’s Differential Returns Relative to the FGV100 by End of
Month Initiated
Month Top 1 PPP Top 5 Top 10
January -1.98% 2.94% * 0.35% 0.41%
February 1.34% -1.05% -0.23% 0.36%
March 0.57% 0.53% -0.11% -0.25%
April 0.49% -0.59% 0.71% -0.37%
May 0.10% 1.50% 0.16% 0.15%
June 1.43% -1.28% -0.34% 0.28%
July 2.29% -0.68% -0.38% -0.32%
August -0.32% -0.65% -0.18% -0.46%
September 4.22% -0.65% 0.21% 0.17%
October 0.53% 1.71% 0.51% 0.38%
November 2.11% -0.53% 0.67% 0.44%
December -0.39% 0.64% -0.14% 0.39%
No Returns < 0     3    7     6    4
*  significant at the 95% level
Table 12 shows the differential returns for each DoD strategy relative to the
IBOVESPA by the end of the month in which the strategy was initiated. We find that most of
the differential returns are negative (43 out of 48 differential returns) and many of them
are statistically significant at the 95% level. Therefore, we conclude that there is no
statistical evidence that the DoD strategies outperform the IBOVESPA.
Table 12 - Sharpe’s Differential Returns Relative to the IBOVESPA
by End of Month Initiated
Month Top 1 PPP Top 5 Top 10
January -4.26% * 0.65% -1.93% -1.87%
February -1.06% -3.46% * -2.63% * -2.05% *
March -2.15% -2.19% -2.83% * -2.96% *
April -2.34% -3.42% * -2.12% * -3.20% *
May -2.37% -0.96% -2.30% * -2.32% *
June -1.16% -3.86% -2.92% * -2.31% *
July 0.88% -2.10% -1.79% -1.74% *
August -1.63% -1.96% -1.49% -1.77% *
September 2.87% -2.01% -1.14% -1.19%
October -1.05% 0.13% -1.07% -1.20%
November 0.17% -2.47% -1.27% -1.50%
December -2.56% -1.54% -2.31% * -1.78%
No Returns < 0     9    10      12     12
*  significant at the 95% level
In order to perform risk adjusted performance tests we employed Jensen's alpha
and Treynor ratios.  We ran regressions of the excess return on the DoD strategy over the
CDI rate against the excess return on the market index (IBOVESPA and FGV100) over the
CDI rate. Table XIII shows estimated beta values relative to the FGV100 for each DoD
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strategy by the month it was initiated. Most of the beta values which are significant are
below unity indicating that the DoD strategy has a low market risk.
Table 13 - FGV100 Betas by End of Month Initiated
Month Top 1 PPP Top 5 Top 10
January 1.04 * 0.68 * 0.92 * 0.95 *
February 0.82 * 0.75 * 0.94 * 0.95 *
March 0.64 * 0.78 * 0.77 * 0.93 *
April 0.99 * 0.46 * 0.91 * 0.92 *
May 0.77 * 0.71 * 0.84 * 0.94 *
June 1.15 * 0.33 0.77 * 0.99 *
July 1.26 * 0.62 0.93 * 1.00 *
August 0.69 * 1.25 * 0.90 * 0.96 *
September 0.13 0.83 * 0.72 * 0.92 *
October 0.98 * 0.25 0.79 * 0.96 *
November 0.72 * 0.95 * 0.81 * 0.94 *
December 1.09 * 0.74 * 0.83 * 0.91 *
Mean 0.86 0.70 0.84 0.95
*  significant at the 95% level
Table 14 shows estimated beta values relative to the IBOVESPA for each DoD
strategy by the month it was initiated. Most of the beta values are significant and below the
unity indicating that the DoD strategy is a lower risk strategy than investing in the market
and would appeal to investors who prefer conservative, lower risk portfolios.
Table 14 - IBOVESPA Betas by End of Month Initiated
Month Top 1 PPP Top 5 Top 10
January 0.68 * 0.48 * 0.50 * 0.54 *
February 0.43 * 0.47 * 0.50 * 0.53 *
March 0.35 * 0.53 * 0.44 * 0.54 *
April 0.66 * 0.32 * 0.55 * 0.55 *
May 0.66 * 0.44 * 0.55 * 0.59 *
June 0.78 * 0.47 * 0.53 * 0.67 *
July 0.88 * 0.57 * 0.64 * 0.66 *
August 0.61 * 0.74 * 0.58 * 0.63 *
September 0.43 * 0.44 * 0.53 * 0.60 *
October 0.58 * 0.34 * 0.51 * 0.59 *
November 0.47 * 0.57 * 0.53 * 0.59 *
December 0.73 * 0.34 * 0.48 * 0.51 *
Mean 0.61 0.48 0.53 0.58
*  significant at the 95% level
Table 15 summarizes Jensen’s alpha relative to the FGV100 by month for each
DoD strategy. Most of the DoD strategies exhibit negative alphas (30 out of 48 Jensen’s
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alphas). The evidence using alphas does not indicate that the DoD strategies achieve
statistically significant risk adjusted excess returns.
Table 15 - Jensen’s Alpha Relative to the FGV100 by End of Month Initiated
Month Top 1 PPP Top 5 Top 10
January -1.85% 2.02% 0.13% 0.26%
February 0.85% -1.74% -0.40% 0.22%
March -0.39% -0.06% -0.71% -0.44%
April 0.46% -1.93% 0.48% -0.56%
May -0.51% 0.74% -0.25% -0.02%
June 1.83% -3.04% -0.95% 0.26%
July 2.82% -1.44% -0.51% -0.33%
August -0.98% -0.11% -0.39% -0.53%
September 1.95% -1.09% -0.51% -0.06%
October 0.46% -0.44% -0.08% 0.27%
November 1.30% -0.67% 0.13% 0.28%
December -0.13% -0.14% -0.64% 0.11%
No Alphas < 0    5     10    9     6
*  significant at the 95% level
Table 16 summarizes Jensen’s alpha relative to the IBOVESPA by month for each
DoD strategy. Most of the DoD strategies exhibit negative alphas (45 out of 48 Jensen’s
alphas). The evidence once again does not suggest that the DoD strategies achieve
statistically significant risk adjusted excess returns.
Table 16 - Jensen’s Alpha Relative to the IBOVESPA by End of Month Initiated
Month Top 1 PPP Top 5 Top 10
January -4.47% * 0.32% -2.25% * -2.17% *
February -1.26% -3.64% * -2.80% * -2.21% *
March -2.11% -2.16% -2.80% * -2.94% *
April -2.23% -3.19% * -1.97% * -3.05% *
May -2.43% -1.07% -2.39% * -2.40% *
June -1.16% -3.88% * -2.94% * -2.32% *
July 0.81% -2.35% -2.01% * -1.94% *
August -1.93% -2.17% -1.82% * -2.06% *
September 2.15% -2.72% -1.73% * -1.69% *
October -1.58% -0.71% -1.69% * -1.71% *
November -0.34% -2.89% -1.72% * -1.89% *
December -2.79% -2.09% -2.74% * -2.19% *
No Alphas < 0    10    11 12 12
* significant at the 95% level
Table 17 shows Treynor ratios relative to the FGV100 by month initiated for each
DoD strategy. It is clear from Table XVII that the DoD strategies do not significantly
outperform the market after adjusting for risk.
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Table 17 - Treynor Ratio with FGV100 Betas by End of Month Initiated










January -4.70% 0.02% -2.78% -2.65% -2.92% -1.78% 2.94% 0.14% 0.28%
February -1.72% -5.08% -3.18% -2.52% -2.75% 1.04% -2.32% -0.43% 0.24%
March -3.27% -2.75% -3.59% -3.14% -2.67% -0.61% -0.08% -0.92% -0.47%
April -2.03% -6.66% -1.97% -3.10% -2.50% 0.47% -4.16% 0.52% -0.60%
May -3.32% -1.62% -2.96% -2.68% -2.66% -0.67% 1.04% -0.30% -0.02%
June -1.03% NM -3.87% -2.36% -2.62% 1.59% NM -1.25% 0.26%
July 0.23% -4.33% -2.55% -2.33% -2.00% 2.23% -2.32% -0.55% -0.33%
August -3.52% -2.19% -2.52% -2.65% -2.10% -1.42% -0.09% -0.43% -0.55%
September NM -3.92% -3.32% -2.67% -2.61% NM -1.30% -0.70% -0.06%
October -2.37% NM -2.94% -2.56% -2.84% 0.47% NM -0.10% 0.29%
November -1.10% -3.60% -2.74% -2.61% -2.90% 1.81% -0.70% 0.16% 0.30%
December -3.13% -3.19% -3.78% -2.89% -3.01% -0.12% -0.18% -0.77% 0.12%
Mean -2.36% -3.33% -3.02% -2.68% -2.63% 0.27% -0.72% -0.39% -0.05%
Std Dev 1.41% 1.87% 0.56% 0.25% 0.31% 1.32% 1.97% 0.50% 0.35%
t test - - - - - 0.21 -0.37 -0.77 -0.13
* significant at 5% level
NM indicates not meaningful due to insignificant beta estimates at 5% level
Table 18 shows Treynor ratios relative to the IBOVESPA by month initiated for each
DoD strategy. The results suggest that the DoD strategies do not significantly outperform
the market after adjusting for risk.
Table 18 - Treynor Ratio Relative with IBOVESPA Betas
by End of Month Initiated








January -7.24% 0.03% -5.17% -4.67% -0.64% -6.60% 0.67% -4.53% -4.04%
February -3.26% -8.02% -5.95% -4.48% -0.35% -2.91% -7.67% -5.60% -4.13%
March -5.93% -4.00% -6.29% -5.35% 0.05% -5.98% -4.05% -6.34% -5.40%
April -3.04% -9.72% -3.25% -5.20% 0.33% -3.37% -10.05% -3.59% -5.53%
May -3.85% -2.62% -4.52% -4.26% -0.19% -3.66% -2.43% -4.33% -4.07%
June -1.52% -8.32% -5.54% -3.51% -0.04% -1.48% -8.28% -5.51% -3.48%
July 0.33% -4.72% -3.74% -3.53% -0.59% 0.91% -4.14% -3.15% -2.95%
August -3.96% -3.72% -3.93% -4.05% -0.78% -3.17% -2.93% -3.15% -3.27%
September 3.76% -7.48% -4.52% -4.06% -1.26% 5.02% -6.23% -3.26% -2.80%
October -3.99% -3.36% -4.61% -4.17% -1.26% -2.73% -2.09% -3.35% -2.91%
November -1.68% -6.08% -4.25% -4.17% -0.96% -0.71% -5.11% -3.28% -3.21%
December -4.69% -6.93% -6.50% -5.14% -0.84% -3.85% -6.09% -5.66% -4.30%
Mean -2.92% -5.41% -4.86% -4.38% -0.54% -2.38% -4.87% -4.31% -3.84%
Std Dev 2.90% 2.83% 1.04% 0.61% 0.51% 3.10% 3.00% 1.18% 0.92%
t test - - - - - -0.77 -1.62 -3.65 * -4.18 *
* significant at 5% level
NM indicates not meaningful due to insignificant beta estimates at 5% level
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5 CONCLUSIONS
The DoD strategy shows only limited evidence that it can add value as an
investment strategy in the U.S. stock market. The Top 1 and Top 5 DoD strategies when
used as a stock selection strategy in an already diversified portfolio show some evidence of
improving risk adjusted return performance.  When the DoD strategy is used to construct
stand-alone investment portfolios its performance is found to be wanting.  We cannot state
that the DoD strategy can be used to improve the investment performance of small
investors who do not already possess diversified portfolios.
The use of the Dogs of the Dow Jones strategy in Brazil shows virtually no evidence
that it can add value as an investment strategy. Our performance evaluation findings
demonstrate that the DoD strategy does not outperform the FGV-100 and the IBOVESPA
indices on an absolute and on a risk adjusted basis over our sample period. Our analysis
suggests that the dividend yield may not be a good variable to select value stocks in Brazil
given existing empirical evidence that value stocks have outperformed growth stocks in
Brazil.
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